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Constitutional Law. City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40
(R.I. 1995). Rhode Island's public school financing system does not
violate education clause or equal protection clause of the State
Constitution.
Challenges to state systems of funding public education have
arisen in nearly every state in the past 20 years.1 Primarily, these
suits have been based on what is characterized as unequal funding
for public school children. In City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, the
Rhode Island Supreme Court faced the issue of whether the state's
public education financing system violated the education clause or
the equal protection clause of the state constitution. The Supreme
Court reversed a superior court decision and held that the statu-
tory financing scheme did not violate either provision of the state
constitution.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
In 1991, three Rhode Island communities initiated suit in su-
perior court alleging that the state's appropriation for elementary
and secondary education as well as the state's method of funding
public education violated the Rhode Island Constitution.2 The de-
fendants included the Governor, Lieutenant Governor and the
Board of Regents for Elementary and Secondary Education. 3
At trial, a proceeding in which over 1,400 pages of testimony
were recorded, the plaintiffs contended that the state's system of
financing public education violated the education clause4 as well as
the equal-protection and due-process guarantees 5 of the State Con-
1. See, e.g., Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359 (Conn. 1977); Rose v. Council for
Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989); Abbot v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359 (N.J.
1990); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989); McDuffy
v. Secretary of Exec. Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516 (Mass. 1993).
2. City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40, 42 (R.I. 1995).
3. Id. at 42 n.2.
4. R.I. Const. art. XII, § 1, which provides: "The diffusion of knowledge, as
well as of virtue among the people, being essential to the preservation of their
rights and liberties, it shall be the duty of the general assembly to promote public
schools and public libraries, and to adopt means which it may deem necessary and
proper to secure to the people the advantages and opportunities of education and
public library services."
5. See, R.I. Const. art. I, § 2, which provides: "[n]o person shall be deprived of
life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied
equal protection of the laws."
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stitution. 6 Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that their right to educa-
tion was compromised because schools in poorer districts received
less funding than those in wealthier districts.7 Conversely, the de-
fendants argued that the "education clause does not guarantee a
right to education, but rather, only a right to have the General As-
sembly formulate a system of education." Additionally, the de-
fendants contended that the means to finance education fall within
the purview of the Legislature's power and that because the state
has a compelling interest in delegating educational control to local
communities, the funding policy did not violate the equal protec-
tion clause. 9
The superior court held that under the Rhode Island Constitu-
tion, "education is a "fundamental and constitutional right" which
"each child has as a resident of Rhode Island ... and that right is
to an opportunity to receive an equal, adequate, and meaningful
education." 10 Under this premise, the court found that the state's
public school financing system violated the education clause, equal
protection clause and due process guarantees of the constitution.
As such, the superior court ordered defendants to "proceed with all
deliberate speed to formulate and establish a system of public
school finance which complies with [the court's decision and
judgment]."11
Subsequent to the superior court's entry of judgment, motions
to intervene were filed by five Rhode Island School Districts.1 2 The
trial justice denied all motions and three of the districts filed an
appeal with the supreme court. 13 In March of 1994, one of the in-
tervenors, East Greenwich, joined by the Westerly and South
Kingstown School Districts, filed a petition for the issuance of cer-
tiorari to review the superior court's order. This petition was
granted by the court. 14 On the same day, the superior court heard
and denied a motion to intervene by the Jamestown School Dis-
6. Sundlun, 662 A.2d at 60.
7. Id. at 60.
8. Id. at 54.
9. Id.
10. Sundlun, 662 A.2d at 55.
11. Id.
12. Exeter-West Greenwich, East Greenwich, Foster-Glocester, Bristol-War-
ren, Middletown; Id. at 43.
13. Id. Bristol-Warren and Middletown did not file appeals in this matter.
14. Id.
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trict. The next day, Jamestown filed a petition for certiorari which
was granted by the court and consolidated with all other pending
appeals in the matter.15
In June of 1994, the Mayor, Superintendent of Schools, and
the School Committee of Providence petitioned to intervene as
plaintiffs in the matter and the court granted their petition. 16
Duri.ng this interim period, plaintiffs filed a motion to remand the
proceedings back to superior court. On April 28, 1994, the
Supreme Court denied the motion to remand "and pointed out that
our grants of certiorari and the pending appeals deprived the Su-
perior Court of jurisdiction."17 Following this flurry of motions and
interventions, on a fully consolidated appeal, the supreme court
was presented with the issue of whether the state's public school
financing system violated the educational, due process, and equal
protection clause of the state constitution.
BACKGROUND
The debate over school financing has been an active one over
the last twenty-five years, permeating nearly every state in the
country.' The landmark decision in school financing is the United
States Supreme Court's decision in San Antonio Independent
School District v. Rodriguez.19 In Rodriguez, the Court held that
although education is one of the most important services per-
formed by the state, it is not within the limited category of rights
recognized by the Court as guaranteed by the United States Con-
stitution.20 From Rodriguez onward, the school financing debate
has festered throughout the union.
15. Sundlun, 662 A.2d at 44.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. See e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973);
Parker v. Mandel, 344 F.Supp. 1068 (D. Md. 1972); Van Duzartz v. Hatfield, 334
F.Supp. 870 (D. Minn. 1971); Buruss v. Wilkerson, 310 F.Supp. 572 (W. D. Va.
1969), aff'd mem., 397 U.S. 44 (1970); McInnis v. Shapiro, 293 F.Supp. 327 (N. D.
IlM. 1968), aff'd mem. sub nom., McInnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969); Horton v.
Meskill, 376 A.2d 359 (Conn. 1977); Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790
S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989); McDuffy v. Secretary of the Exec. Office of Educ., 615
N.E.2d 516 (Ma. 1993); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex.
1989).
19. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
20. 411 U.S. at 35.
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It has been suggested that school finance litigation across the
country has appeared in three distinct waves. 21 The first wave is
what became known as the "fiscal neutrality theory."22 Under this
theory, reformers claimed that the Federal Constitution's Equal
Protection Clause guaranteed equal funding for all school districts
within a state, and that any disparities based on wealth denied
poor children equal protection under the law.2 3
The second wave of school finance cases involved the same
equal protection reasoning as the first wave with one marked dif-
ference. Due to the Supreme Court's decision in Rodriguez, liti-
gants were now forced to rely upon the equal protection clauses
found in state constitutions as opposed to the equal protection
clause of the federal constitution. 24
The third and final wave began in 1989, as state courts began
striking down school financing systems not based on state constitu-
tion equal protection clauses, but rather, based on state education
clauses. 25 This trend, favoring quality of education over equality
of funding based on state education clauses as opposed to equal
protection provisions, appears to be the future of school finance liti-
gation.26 It is under the guise of the state education clause as well
as the equal protection clause of the state constitution which the
plaintiffs in Sundlun brought their claim.27
21. See William E. Thro, The Third Wave: The Implications of the Montana,
Kentucky, and Texas Decisions for the Future of Public School Finance Reform Liti-
gation, 19 J.L. & Educ. 219 (1990).
22. Betsy Levin, Current Trends in School Finance Reform Litigation: A Com-
mentary, 1977 Duke L.J. 1099, 1101 (1977); William Thro, To Render Them Safe:
The Analysis of State Constitutional Provisions in Public School Finance Reform
Litigation, 75 Va. L. Rev. 1639, 1650-51 (1989).
23. U.S. Const. amend. X1V § 1. See Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241, 1247
(Cal. 1971).
24. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 1 (no fundamental right to education under the
Constitution); See eg., Robinson v. Cahill. 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973), cert denied,
414 U.S. 976 (1973)(overturning N.J. school finance system, which relied on local
property taxes, as violative of state constitution education clause).
25. See e.g., Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989);
Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 769 P.2d 684 (Mont. 1989); William
Thro, Judicial Analysis During the Third Wave of School Finance Litigation: The
Massachusetts Decision as a Model, 35 B.C. L. Rev. 597 (1994).
26. Thro, supra note 25, at 604.
27. Sundlun, 662 A.2d at 40.
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ANALYsIs AND HOLDING
The Sundlun court began its analysis by summarizing the
standard of review in construing statutory and constitutional pro-
visions. 28 The court explained that "[b]ecause of the broad plenary
power of the General Assembly, this court's evaluation of legisla-
tive enactments has been extremely deferential. .. "29 Specifically,
the court noted that it would "not invalidate a legislative enact-
ment unless the party challenging the enactment can prove beyond
a reasonable doubt. .. that the statute in question is repugnant to
a provision in the constitution."30
After a substantial review of the statutory and constitutional
underpinnings of public education in Rhode Island the court con-
cluded that equal division of funds was not intended and further
that education not was a fundamental right.31 Specifically, the
court came to examine Article XII of the State Constitution as
adopted in 1986 and stated that: "t]he convention's adoption of ar-
ticle 12, section 1, signifies that the framers of the 1986 Constitu-
tion did not intend to alter the state's approach to funding
education or to impose new constitutional requirements upon the
General Assembly in respect to education."32
Based upon this historical precedent and the language of the
constitution, the court concluded that the education clause did not
confer a fundamental and constitutional right to education and did
not guarantee "equal, adequate, and meaningful education."33 The
court buttressed this conclusion by stating "at the time article 12
was adopted and for decades afterward, there was no requirement
that public education be provided at all in this state."34
Conversely, the plaintiffs cited extensively to the Supreme
Court's decision in School Committee of Westerly v. Westerly Teach-
ers Ass'n35 claiming the court had "consistently found education to
be a fundamantal right under the Rhode Island Constitution."
36
28. Id. at 45.
29. Id. at 44.
30. Id at 45 (citing Gorham v. Robinson, 186 A. 832, 837 (R.I. 1936)).
31. Sundlun, 662 A.2d at 45-50.
32. Id. at 50.
33. Id. at 55. See supra note 4.
34. Sundlun, 662 A.2d at 55 citing Charles Carroll, Public Education in Rhode
Island, ch. IV at 145 and ch. V at 202.
35. 299 A.2d 441 (R.I. 1973).
36. Sundlun, 662 A.2d at 57.
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The Court, however, disagreed and stated that "Westerly Teachers
stands for the propostion that outside forces may not interfere with
the education of Rhode Island youth. It does not cite any restric-
tions on the General Assembly's constitutionally assigned duty to
promote public education in Rhode Island."37
The Court then went on to to find that plaintiffs' request for
relief, namely, the creation of new financing standards, would vio-
late the separation of powers doctrine.38 Under INS v. Chadha,39
the separation of powers doctrine can be violated in two ways.
First, "one branch may interfere impermissibly with the other's
performance of its constitutionally assigned function" or secondly,
a violation occurs "when one branch assumes a function that more
properly is entrusted to another."40
In Sundlun, the court held that the plaintiffs' requested relief
would violate both propositions. First, it would force the court to
"interfere with the plenary constitutional power of the General As-
sembly in education."41 Second, "by urging that we order 'equity'
in funding sufficient to 'achieve learner outcomes,' plaintiffs have
asked that the court take on a responsibility explicitly committed
to the Legislature."42 Accordingly, the court held that the proper
forum for this deliberation is in the General Assembly; for it is the
court's duty to determine the law, not make it. 43
The plaintiffs' final challenge rested on the premise that the
school financing system violated the equal-protection and due-pro-
cess guarantees of the state constitution. 44 This argument was
similarly rejected by the court.45 The court first stated that there
exists no fundamental right to education and that wealth is not a
suspect class for purposes of equal protection analysis. Therefore,
the proper level of review was that of "minimal scrutiny."46 In
other words, the funding system had to be upheld if it was "ration-
37. Id.
38. Id. at 58.
39. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
40. Sundlun, 662 A.2d at 58 (quoting Chadha, 462 U.S. at 963).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703 (1974).
44. Sundlun, 662 A.2d at 60.
45. Id. at 61.
46. Id; See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 35; Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 471 (1977).
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ally related to a legitimate state interest."47 Under this rational
basis test, the court held that the "preservation of local control is a
legitimate state interest and that the current financing system is
rationally related to that legitimate state interest."48 As such, the
public school financing system was held not to violate the equal
protection clause of the state constitution and the decision of the
lower court was reversed in full.
CONCLUSION
In Sundlun, the Rhode Island Supreme Court decided that
neither the Education, nor the Equal Protection Clauses of the
Rhode Island Constitution were violated by the General Assem-
bly's education financing system. The court concluded that deter-
minations of educational financing are properly addressed by the
legislature. Under the complicated constitutional scenario of this
case, this survey is best concluded by Justice Lederberg's own
words: "A judge accustomed to the constraints implicit in adver-
sary litigation cannot feasibly by judicial mandate interfere with
this delicate balance without creating chaos." 49
Joseph T. Healey
47. Sundlun, 662 A.2d at 61.
48. Id. at 62.
49. Id. at 63.
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Constitutional Law. Dart Industries, Inc. v. Clark, 657 A.2d
1062 (R.I. 1995). Section 44-11-11 of the Rhode Island General
Laws, which treats foreign and domestic dividends differently for
tax purposes, declared unconstitutional as violative of the Foreign
Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.
Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution provides
that "[t]he Congress shall have Power ... [t]o regulate commerce
with foreign Nations."1 The Fourteenth Amendment then states
that "[n]o state shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws."2 Based upon these constitutional
provisions, as well the recent holding of the United States
Supreme Court in Kraft General Foods, Inc. v. Iowa Department of
Revenue and Finance,3 the Rhode Island Supreme Court declared
section 44-11-11 of the Rhode Island General Laws4 unconstitu-
tional. The statute violates the Foreign Commerce Clause because
of its treatment of foreign dividends "less favorably than those paid
by domestic corporations."5
1. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, c. 3.
2. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
3. 505 U.S. 71 (1992) (holding Iowa statute allowing corporations to take de-
ductions for dividends received from domestic, but not foreign subsidiaries, de-
clared unconstitutional in that it facially discriminates against foreign commerce
in violation of the Foreign Commerce Clause).
4. R.I. Gen. Law § 44-11-11 (1995) states:
Net income means for any taxable year and for any corporate taxpayer,
the taxable income of the taxpayer for that taxable year under the laws of
the United States, plus (i) any interest not include in the taxable income,
(ii) any specific exemptions, and (iii) the tax imposed by this chapter, and
minus (iv) interest on obligations of the United States or its possessions,
and other interest exempt from taxation by this state, and (v) the federal
net operating loss deduction. (2) ... However, Rhode Island taxable in-
come shall not include the 'grossup of dividends' required by the federal
Internal Revenue Code to be taken into taxable income in connection with
the taxpayer's election of foreign tax credit ... Id.
Unlike the federal statute, this section does not allow a corporation receiving
foreign dividend income to credit that income against its Rhode Island tax liability
for any portion of the foreign taxes attributable to foreign dividend income. Dart
Indus., Inc. v. Clark, 657 A.2d 1062, 1064 (R.I. 1995); 26 U.S.C. §§ 901, 902 (1988).
5. Dart, 657 A.2d at 1066.
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FACTS AND TRAVEL
Dart Industries (Dart), a manufacturer of plastic products,
maintains a local office in Woonsocket, Rhode Island.6 From 1981
to 1983, Dart filed its Rhode Island Business Corporation Tax re-
turn with the Rhode Island Division of Taxation. 7 Over the course
of those three years, Dart excluded, "by deductions or otherwise,
dividends it received from foreign subsidiary corporations (foreign
dividend income)."8 In 1984, Dart was the subject of a field audit
which encompassed the taxable years of 1981, 1982 and 1983.9
As a result of the audit, "the tax division's field auditor in-
cluded foreign dividend income in computing Dart's net income
subject to Rhode Island apportionment and taxation for each calen-
dar tax year in question."10 Following the adjustments, Dart's tax
liability was recomputed and the tax division's issued of deficiency
notices to Dart for the taxable years in question." In October of
1985, Dart filed a request for administrative review.12
The first component of the Dart's review consisted of an infor-
mal preliminary conference which resulted in a reduction of the
additional tax assessments. 13 Thereafter, Dart, not satisfied with
these initial reductions, filed for a formal hearing pursuant to
Rhode Island's Administrative Procedure Act.' 4 At the formal
hearing, Dart contended that § 44-11-11 violated the Foreign Com-
merce Clause because it treated domestic dividends more favorably
than those dividends received from foreign subsidiaries.' 5 The
presiding officer rejected Dart's contention and reasoned that these
constitutional arguments "would be better suited to the federal
6. Id. at 1063.
7. Id.
8. Dart, 657 A.2d at 1063.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Dart, 657 A.2d at 1063.
13. Id. Review pursuant to Rhode Island Division of Taxation regulation No.
AHP 94-01 B.5.
14. Id. R.I. Gen Laws §§ 42-35-1 to -18 (1993) R.I. Gen. Law § 44-11-6 (1995)
states in part: If any taxpayer is not satisfied with the amount of tax so deter-
mined, the tax administrator, upon being so notified in writing within thirty (30)
days from the date of the mailing of the notice, shall fix an early date at his or her
office when the taxpayer can be heard to show cause why the tax should be
changed, and after which the tax administrator may redetermine the amount of
that tax. Id.
15. Dart, 657 A.2d at 1064.
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courts."16 The tax administrator adopted the written recommen-
dation in his final opinion and thereafter, Dart prepaid the revised
tax assessments17 and "availed itself of the opportunity for a de
novo review of the administrator's Final Decision and Order in the
Sixth Division District Court."' 8 The district court then issued a
judgment stating that Dart was not entitled to a tax refund since
sections 44-11-11 and 44-11-12 did not violate the Foreign Com-
merce Clause and/or the Equal Protection Clause of the United
States Constitution. 19
Following the issuance of the district court's decision, Dart
filed both a motion to reconsider in the district court and a writ of
certiorari to the Rhode Island Supreme Court.20 The district court
denied Dart's motion to reconsider, causing Dart to file a second
writ of certiorari with the supreme court. 2 ' The supreme court
granted both petitions and consolidated them for briefing and ar-
gument. 22 In the time span between granting certiorari and dock-
eting the matters, the United States Supreme Court issued its
decision in Kraft General Foods, Inc. v. Iowa Department of Reve-
nue and Finance. 23 As a result of this decision,24 the Rhode Island
Supreme Court remanded the case back to the district court "for
reconsideration of the issues in light of Kraft and for a determina-
tion of whether Kraft [should] be applied prospectively only or
retroactively."25
16. Id.
17. Id. See generally R.I. Gen. Laws § 8-8-26 (1985) and R.I. Gen. Laws § 44-
11-35 (1985), amended by P.L.1982, ch. 388, §§ 3,8.
Section 44-11-35 states in relevant part: "[Tihe taxpayer's right to appeal
hereunder shall be expressly made condition upon prepayment of all taxes, inter-
est and penalties" unless the taxpayer is granted an exemption by meeting the
very stringent requirements of section 8-8-26 by proving that the taxpayer has a
reasonable probability of success on the merits and is financially unable to pay the
taxes due. See Dart, 657 A.2d at 1064 n.4.
18. Dart, 657 A.2d at 1064. See § 44-11-35 and R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 8-8-24 to -
32 (1985).
19. Dart, 657 A.2d at 1064.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Kraft, 505 U.S. 71.
24. See supra note 3.
25. Dart, 657 A.2d at 1064 (quoting Dart Indus., Inc. v. Clark, 619 A.2d 1130,
1131 (R.I. 1993)(alteration in original).
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On remand, the district court held that Kraft applied retroac-
tively and thus invalidated section 44-11-11 under the Foreign-
Commerce Clause.26 In addition, the district court also concluded
that Dart was entitled to a refund of his prepaid taxes and that
"the predeprivation remedies available to a Rhode Island taxpayer
were inadequate to satisfy the due-process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment to the United States Constitution so as to pre-
clude claim for a refund."27
The court granted certiorari to determine "(1) whether the
United States Supreme Court's Kraft decision should apply retro-
actively, (2) whether section 44-1-11 entitles Dart to a refund of
prepaid taxes, and (3) whether Rhode Island's predeprivation rem-
edies were sufficient under the Due Process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment to the United States Constitution."28
BACKGROUND
Pursuant to the Internal Revenue Code, a corporation receiv-
ing a dividend from a domestic subsidiary is allowed to deduct all
or a portion of that dividend from its taxable income. 29 On the
other hand, "a corporation receiving a foreign dividend is only al-
lowed to claim a deduction for the foreign taxes that were paid by
the foreign affiliate to earn the funds represented by that divi-
dend."30 Therefore, if a domestic corporation owned at least ten
percent of the voting stock of a foreign corporation and received
dividends as a result, the domestic corporation could elect to in-
clude in its income "an amount equal to the foreign taxes that are
deemed attributable to the foreign dividend," and could then
"claim a credit against its own tax liability for those foreign
taxes."31
26. Id. at 1065.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. 26 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 243 (1988). Section 243 states, in part, "In the case
of a corporation, there shall be allowed as a deduction.., the amount received as
dividends from a domestic corporation."
30. Dart, 657 A.2d at 1063. See 26 U.S.C. § 164 (1988). Section 164 states, in
part, "Except as otherwise provided in this section, the following taxes shall be
allowed as a deduction ... (3) state and local, and foreign, income, war profits, and
excess profits taxes." Id. at 26 U.S.C. § 164(a)(3) (1988).
31. Dart, 657 A.2d at 1063. 26 U.S.C. §§ 901-902 (1988) (taxes of foreign coun-
tries and of possessions of the United States. Section 901 deemed paid credit where
domestic corporation owns 10 percent or more of voting stock of foreign corpora-
SURVEY SECTION
Under Rhode Island law, a corporation's net income is defined
as its federal taxable income.3 2 Pursuant to section 44-11-11, a
corporation could exclude from its Rhode Island income "dividends
received from the shares of stock of ... any corporation liable to a
tax imposed by this chapter."33 Under this language, an exemp-
tion is created for dividends paid by corporations with a connection
to Rhode Island. 34
Section 44-11-11, unlike 26 U.S.C. §§ 901-902, "does not allow
a corporation receiving foreign dividend income to credit that in-
come against its Rhode Island tax liability for any portion of the
foreign taxes attributable to foreign dividend income."35 Accord-
ingly, since Rhode Island has no mirror to the federal credit sys-
tem, foreign dividends are usually taxable as net income in Rhode
Island, whereas domestic dividends are not.3 6
Similarly, in Kraft, the United States Supreme Court held
that an Iowa statute, which did not allow a credit for taxes paid to
foreign countries, facially discriminated against foreign commerce
in violation of the Foreign Commerce Clause. 37 In Kraft, the Court
stated "[t]he adoption of the federal system in whole or in part,
however, cannot shield a state tax statute from Commerce Clause
scrutiny. The Iowa statute cannot withstand this scrutiny, for it
facially discriminates against foreign commerce and therefore vio-
lates the Foreign Commerce Clause."38 Based upon the U.S.
Supreme Court's holding, the issue before the Rhode Island
Supreme Court became how to apply the holding in Kraft, specifi-
cally, whether Kraft should be applied prospectively or
retroactively.
tion. Dart, 657 A.2d at 1063. (Section 901 applies to taxation of foreign countries
and of possessions in the United States; section 902 applies to deemed paid credit
where domestic corporation owns 10 percent or more of the voting stock of a for-
eign corporation).
32. Dart, 657 A.2d at 1063. See supra note 4.
33. Id. at 1063. See supra note 4.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 1064. See also R.I. Gen. Laws § 44-11-11; 26 U.S.C. §§ 901, 902.
36. Dart, 657 A.2d at 1064.
37. Kraft Gen. Foods, Inc. v. Iowa Dep't of Revenue and Fin., 505 U.S. 71
(1992).
38. Id. at 82.
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ANALYsis AND HOLDING
The court, in deciding to apply Kraft retroactively, relied upon
the United States Supreme Court's recent ruling in Harper v. Vir-
ginia Department of Taxation.3 9 In Harper, the Supreme Court re-
inforced a principle mandating that when the Supreme Court
applies a rule of federal law to the parties before it, that rule
is the controlling interpretation of federal law and must be
given full retroactive effect in all cases still open on direct re-
view and as to all events, regardless of whether such events
predate or postdate our announcement of the rule.40
Prior to Harper, courts, in determining the application of a new
decision, relied upon a three-pronged equitable analysis as set
forth by the Supreme Court in Chevron Oil v. Huson.41 Since 1971,
however, the Supreme Court has slowly chipped away at this
three-prong rule.
The first step in this diminution occured in the criminal con-
text when the Supreme Court discarded the equitable analysis rule
and held that all newly declared rules must be applied retroac-
tively to all criminal cases pending on direct review.42 The diminu-
tion continued in Harper, "the United States Supreme Court
appears to have virtually eviscerated Chevron Oil's equitable anal-
ysis in the civil context."43 The Harper Court further stated that
39. 509 U.S. 89 (1993).
40. Harper, 509 U.S. at 96. See James Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501
U.S. 529, 539 (1991).
41. 404 U.S. 97 (1971)("First, the decision to be applied nonretroactively must
establish a new principle of law, either by overruling clear past precedent on which
litigants may have relied, or by deciding an issue of first impression whose resolu-
tion was not clearly foreshadowed. Second, it has been stressed that "we must...
weigh the merits and demerits in each case by looking to the prior history of the
rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will
further or retard its operation." Finally, we have weighed the inequity imposed by
retroactive application, for '[w]here a decision of this Court could produce substan-
tial inequitable results if applied retroactively, there is ample basis in our cases
for avoiding the 'injustice or hardship' by a holding of nonretroactivity'." 404 U.S.
at 106-107 (internal citations omitted)(alterations in original).
42. Dart, 657 A.2d at 1065; See Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987), over-
ruling Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618.
43. Dart, 657 A.2d at 1065. ("[tlhus, Harper appears to be the culmination of
the United State's Supreme Court's efforts to prohibit from consideration the
"'particular equities of [individual parties] claims' of actual reliance on an old rule
and of harm from retroactive application of the new rule" in determining the retro-
spective application of a recent decision. Id.; See Harper, 509 U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct.
at 2517 (quoting in part James Beam, 501 U.S. at 543).
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"the legal imperative 'to apply a rule of federal law retroactively
after the case announcing the rule has already done so' must
'prevai[l] over any claim based on a Chevron Oil analysis.'"44
Accordingly, under the rule set forth in Harper, the Rhode Is-
land Supreme Court was bound to apply Kraft retroactively."45
With the Kraft decision being applied retroactively, the Rhode
Island Supreme Court was compelled to hold that section 44-11-11,
which contained the same "fatal flaw" 46 present in the Iowa stat-
ute, "facially discriminates against against foreign commerce and
therefore violates the Foreign Commerce Clause."47
Finally, the administrator contended that even if Kraft did ap-
ply retroactively, section 44-1-11 did not entitle Dart to a refund of
the prepaid taxes. 48 The administrator argued that the term
"overpayment" and "erroneous payment" contained in the statute
did not allow a refund for illegal or unauthorized payments. 49 The
supreme court, utilizing well settled rules of statutory construc-
tion, disposed of the administrator's argument. The court ex-
plained that such a construction would produce an absurd or
unreasonable result, because the taxpayer would be forced to
either acquiesce to an adverse decision of the tax administrator, or
prepay the tax, challenge the decision, and even if successful, be
denied a refund. 50 As such, Dart was entitled to a refund of his
prepaid taxes.
44. Dart, 657 A.2d at 1066; See Harper, 509 U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2519
(quoting James Beam, 501 U.S. at 540).
45. Dart, 657 A.2d at 1066.
46. A preference for domestic commerce over foreign commerce. Id.
47. Dart, 657 A.2d at 1066 (quoting Kraft, 505 U.S. at 82).
48. Id. at 1066. R.I. Gen. Laws § 44-1-11 G.L.1956 (1980 Reenactment) is a
refund statute which provides: "[wihenever an erroneous payment, or any patment
in excess of the correct amount of any tax, excise, fee, penalty, interest, or other
charge shall have been made to the tax administrator, the general treasurer shall,
after certification by the tax administrator with the approval of the director of ad-
ministration, refind such erroneous payment or overpayment, or the tax adminis-
trator may credit the same against any tax then or thereafter due, as the
circumstances may warrant." Dart, 657 A.2d at 1066 n.7.
49. Dart, 657 A.2d at 1066.
50. Id. See also, State v. Benoit, 650 A.2d 1230, 1232 (R.I. 1994); State v.
Kane, 625 A.2d 1361, 1363 (R.I. 1993); State v. McDonald, 602 A.2d 923, 926 (R.I.
1992); Trembley v. City of Central Falls, 480 A.2d 1359, 1360 (R.I. 1984).
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CONCLUSION
While on the surface the application of the Kraft decision ap-
peared to be a clear cut issue, the Rhode Island Supreme Court
was forced to contend with what has been an ongoing debate over
the application of new federal law to pending cases. Be that as it
may, once the issue of retroactivity was resolved, the court de-
clared section 44-11-11 unconstitutional because it treated foreign
dividends less favorably than domestic dividends in violation of the
Foreign Commerce Clause.
Joseph T. Healey
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Constitutional Law. Rhode Island Depositors Economic Protec-
tion Corporation v. Brown, 659 A.2d 95 (R.I. 1995). DEPCO Act
found constitutional under the Equal Protection, Due Process and
Bill of Attainer Clauses of the United States Constitution and the
Rhode Island Constitution.
The Rhode Island Depositors Economic Protection Corporation
("DEPCO") was created by the Rhode Island General Assembly in
response to the ensuing financial crisis that affected the state, at-
tributable to the closing of RISDIC and the forty five financial in-
stitutions and credit unions it insured.' In Rhode Island
Depositors Economic Protection Corporation v. Brown2 the Gover-
nor of Rhode Island requested an advisory opinion3 from the Rhode
Island Supreme Court regarding the constitutionality of the Act.4
1. R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 42-116-1 to -40 (1993). The DEPCO Act provides in rel-
evant part:
Notwithstanding any provisions of law to the contrary, a person, a
corporation, or other entity who has resolved its liability to the Rhode Is-
land Depositors' Economic Protection Corporation, the receiver of Rhode
Island Share and Deposit Indemnity Corporation or the receiver of any
state chartered financial institution in a judicially-approved good faith
settlement shall not be liable for claims for contribution or equitable in-
demnity regarding matters addressed in the settlement. Such settlement
does not discharge any other joint tortfeasors unless its terms so provide,
but it reduces the potential liability of such joint tortfeasors by the
amount of the settlement.
"The provisions of this section shall apply solely and exclusively to the settle-
ment of liabilities to [DEPCO]... ." R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-116-40 (1993). DEPCO, a
public corporation, was charged with the payment of the deposit liabilities of the
failed financial institutions, the liquidation of their assets, and the pursuit of
tortfeasors who contributed to the banking crisis.
2. 659 A.2d 95 (R.I. 1995).
3. The Governor may request a legal opinion from the Rhode Island Supreme
Court pursuant to article 10, section 3, of the Rhode Island Constitution. R.I.
Const. art. X, § 3.
4. The Governor's request was in the form of three questions;
1. Whether the provisions of R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-116-40 violate the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution or Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution of the State
of Rhode Island?
2. Whether the provisions of R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-116-40 violate the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Con-
stitution or Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution of the State of Rhode
Island?
3. Whether the provisions of R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-116-40 constitute an
unlawful bill of attainer in violation of Article I, Section 10 of the [United
States] Constitution? Brown, 659 A.2d at 98.
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Consequently, the Rhode Island Supreme Court consolidated the
matters and responded in the form of an opinion which found the
Act to be constitutional. 5
FACTS AND TRAVEL
DEPCO's duties included pursuing tortfeasors thought respon-
sible for the banking crisis. 6 On February 20, 1992, DEPCO filed a
complaint against Ernst & Young 7 in Rhode Island Superior Court.
The cause of action was negligence, negligent misrepresentation
and breach of contract.8
In July of 1993 the Rhode Island General Assembly passed the
Act. Among other things, the Act retroactively eliminated rights of
non-settling parties involved in the credit union crisis from seeking
contribution from settling parties.9
On September 29, 1994, plaintiffs DEPCO and Edward D.
Pare, Jr., in his capacity as receiver for Brown University Employ-
ees Credit Union, filed a complaint against certain former officers
and directors of the Brown University Employees Credit Union "al-
leging that the directors' negligence in the supervision, manage-
ment, and operation of the credit union caused its failure and
resulted in damages to plaintiffs." 10 On October 14, 1994, the de-
fendants filed a third-party complaint for contribution and indem-
nity against Ernst & Young and certain of its present and former
partners, as well as a motion to certify questions concerning the
5. Brown, 659 A.2d 95.
6. Id. at 99.( The legislation created an entirely new financial institute re-
ceivership law and appointed DEPCO as the receiver for RISDIC. Fulfilling its
statutory duties, DEPCO pursued parties who contributed to the banking crisis
and litigation ensued in Rhode Island Superior Court).
7. Ernst & Young is a public accounting firm whose responsibilities included
auditing and reporting the financial condition of the institutions which RISDIC
insured.
8. Brown, 659 A.2d at 99. (The complaint alleged that Ernst & Young issued
unqualified audit opinions to RISDIC and sought damages from Ernst & Young for
not properly auditing and reporting the financial condition of the failed
institutions).
9. Id. at 104. Two weeks after passage of the Act, Ernst & Young filed a de-
claratory judgment action in Federal District Court seeking to declare the Act un-
constitutional. The district court dismissed the complaint on ripeness and
abstention grounds and the First Circuit subsequently affirmed on appeal. Ernst
& Young v. Depositors Economic Protection Corp., 45 F.3d 530 (1st Cir. 1995).
10. Brown, 659 A.2d at 98.
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constitutionality of the Act.1 ' The trial justice entered an order
approving the settlement and certified 12 to the supreme court four
questions essentially similar to those certified by the Governor.' 3
BACKGROUND
Prior to the enactment of the Act, a non-settling defendant in a
RISDIC case was able to seek contribution from all other joint
tortfeasors pursuant to sections 10-6-1 to -11 of the Rhode Island
General Laws, with the exception of those defendants who had en-
tered into settlements that expressly released all claims against all
potentially responsible parties for the settling party's proportion-
ate share of the overall liability.14 Under the DEPCO Act, how-
ever, a tortfeasor who refuses to settle out of court, but is later
found liable at trial, may not bring an action for contribution
against a party that had previously settled out of court.' 5 Rather,
that tortfeasor could only deduct the full amount of any settlement
by joint tortfeasors from the judgment against it.16
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
In determining whether the Act violated equal protection prin-
ciples the court began with the assumption that all legislative en-
actments of the General Assembly are presumed to be valid and
11. Id. (On October 17, 1994, the plaintiffs filed a similar motion, questioning
the constitutionality of the Act, and a motion seeking the Superior Court's ap-
proval, pursuant to the Act, of a settlement that plaintiffs and defendants had
reached). Id.
12. Id. Parties may motion the court or the court may on its own certify ques-
tions for appeal pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-24-27.
13. Id. (The questions submitted by the Rhode Island Superior Court differ
only in that the certified questions of the Governor's also request an opinion from
the Court with respect to whether the Act constitutes a law impairing the obliga-
tion of contracts in violation of Article 1, Section 12, of the Rhode Island Constitu-
tion). Id.
14. R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 10-6-1 to -11 (1985) state, in part: "The prior contribu-
tion law ensured that, if a joint tortfeasor were held responsible (and paid) more
than its ratable share of damages, it could seek damages in the form of contribu-
tion from other joint tortfeasors who had not paid their proportionate share of
liability."
15. R.I. Gen.Laws § 42-116-40 (1993).
16. Id.
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constitutional 17 and that the party challenging the constitutional
validity of an act carries the burden of persuading the court.' 8
Since the parties conceded that the Act did not infringe on a
fundamental right or result in the creation of a suspect class, the
court determined that the Act was an example of economic legisla-
tion entitled to rational review. 19
In support of their argument that the Act violates equal pro-
tection principles, Ernst & Young reminded the court that the
state may not rely on an illegitimate or invidious goal when distin-
guishing among similarly situated persons. 20 In furtherance of
that argument Ernst & Young cited to Boucher v. Sayeed to demon-
strate that the court found a legislative enactment could be uncon-
stitutional even under the minimal standard of rational basis
review.21
Ultimately, the court differentiated the DEPCO Act from the
legislation in Boucher and held that the "Act comports with the
requirements of equal protection under both the United States and
Rhode Island Constitutions."22 The court explained that the de-
fendants in RISDIC tort cases are insured under "defense-within-
limits" or "wasting asset" insurance policies.23 The court con-
cluded that more of the insurance proceeds will reach DEPCO
through settlements rather than through costly litigation, thus
ruling that the settlement provisions within the Act related to the
legitimate state objective of resolving the banking crisis. 24
17. Brown, 659 A.2d at 100, citing Kennedy v. State, 654 A.2d 708, 712 (R.I.
1995); Kass v. Retirement Bd. of the Employees Retirement System, 567 A.2d 358,
360 (R.I. 1989).
18. Id. at 100, citing Brennan v. Kirby, 529 A.2d 633, 639 (R.I. 1987).
19. Id. (The Court points out that to survive rational review, the Act must be
related to a legitimate legislative objective). Id.
20. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 883 (1985).
21. Boucher v. Sayeed, 459 A.2d 87, 94 (R.I. 1993). In Boucher, the Court held
that amendments to the state's Medical Malpractice Reform Act failed to satisfy
rational basis review under the equal protection clause because the amendments
gave medical doctors and hospitals special treatment unavailable to the tortfeasors
and treated medical malpractice plaintiffs different from other plaintiffs.
22. Brown, 659 A.2d at 101.
23. Id. (Under these policies all costs associated with litigation are paid by
the insurance companies and are deducted from the policy limits as they are
incurred).
24. Id.
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Next, the court held that the Act had a retroactive effect upon
a property right subject to due process. 25 In making that determi-
nation, the court looked to whether the statute attached new legal
consequences to events completed before its enactment. In this
matter it was clear that before the Act was adopted, Ernst &
Young held a claim for contribution against all potential
tortfeasors arising out of their past actions concerning RISDIC and
the credit unions. 26 The Act proceeded to eliminate this right
against tortfeasors who settled with DEPCO. 27 The court further
determined that Ernst & Young's pre-existing right to contribution
was properly viewed as a property right. 28
The court explained that although a statute has a retroactive
effect that implicates property rights, it does not necessarily follow
that the statute is unconstitutional. 29 Employing a balancing test
in making its final determination, the court weighed the public in-
terest in retroactivity against the unfairness created. 30 In deter-
mining that Ernst & Young's reliance on the preexisting state of
contribution law did not outweigh the benefits of the Act, the court
recognized the great public interest in minimizing the taxpayers
liability for the depositor bailout.
In analyzing the question of whether the Act constitutes an
unlawful attainer31 , the court followed a three-part inquiry estab-
lished by the United States Supreme Court in Selective Service
System v. Minnesota Public Interest Research Group, 468 U.S. 841,
852 (1984).32 The Court held that the "Act is intended to promote
the settlement of claims, not to operate as a criminal penalty."33
25. Id. at 102 (citing Landgraf v. USI Film Product, 114 S. Ct. 1483, 1499
(1994)).
26. Brown, 659 A.2d at 102.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 103 (citing Brennan v. Kirby, 529 A.2d 640,641 (R.I. 1987) (uphold-
ing statutory denial of seniority rights to combat veterans)).
30. Brown, 659 A.2d at 103.
31. The U.S. Constitution provides in part that "[no] state shall... pass any
bill of attainer." U.S. Const. art. I, Sec. 10.
32. 468 U.S. at 852. The three steps identified by the United States Supreme
Court are: "(1) whether the challenged statute falls within the historical meaning
of legislative punishment; (2) whether the statute 'viewed in terms of the type and
severity of burdens imposed, reasonably can be said to further nonpunitive legisla-
tive purposes'; and (3) whether the legislative record 'evinces a congressional in-
tent to punish.'"
33. Brown, 659 A.2d at 105.
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Moreover, the Court pointed out that the Act's goal of encouraging
settlement and saving the amount and cost of litigation could rea-
sonably be said to further non-punitive legislative purposes.3 4 Be-
cause the Court could find no clear legislative intent to target
specific individuals, nor could it determine whether the Act stand-
ing alone would advantage or disadvantage a discernible party it
ruled that the Act could not be construed as an unlawful bill of
attainder.35
Finally, the Court held that the Act is not a law which impairs
the obligation of contracts in violation of the Rhode Island or
United States Constitution.36 The Court finding no contractual
right which was impaired by the Act, restated it's settled position
that "'even if [they] were to find an impairment of the contractual
relationship, that impairment would be outweighed by the legiti-
mate public purpose of returning funds to the deposit creditors and
eventually to the Rhode Island economy.'-37
CONCLUSION
Recognizing the importance of it's decision in Brown the court
stated that, "[t]he determination of the constitutionality of the
DEPCO Act is the linchpin of the settlement in the underlying
cause of action and all future settlements in DEPCO litigation."38
By upholding the constitutional validity of the Act, the court rein-
forced the state legislature's attempts to guide Rhode Island out of
financial uncertainty and into an environment which promises pre-
dictability and equality for all those affected by the closing of
RISDIC.
As a consequence of this decision, parties to DEPCO litigation
are encouraged to settle claims out of court, thus minimizing litiga-
tion cost and maximizing judicial efficiency. This legitimate legis-
lative objective allows for the most efficient allocation of the
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 106.
37. Brown, 659 A.2d at 106 (quoting In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor
(DEPCO), 593 A.2d 943, 949 (R.I. 1991)).
38. Id. at 100.
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liability insurance of the failed credit unions which will ultimately
minimize the taxpayers liability for the depositor bailout.
Peter E. LaPointe
250 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 1:213
Constitutional Law. State v. Lopes, 660 A.2d 707 (R.I. 1995);
State v. Chiaradio, 660 A.2d 276 (R.I. 1995). The constitutional
right to privacy of unmarried persons does not include the right to
commit acts against nature.'
The Constitution of the United States provides for a funda-
mental right of privacy. 2 However, the Rhode Island Supreme
Court, in State v. Lopes3 and State v. Chiaradio4 has reitterated
that the "decision of unmarried adults to engage in private consen-
sual sexual activities is not of such a fundamental nature ... to
warrant its inclusion in the guarantee of personal privacy."5 The
court in Lopes and Chiaradio reaffirmed its long standing position
that the constitutionally provided right to privacy does not extend
to unmarried adults committing crimes against nature.6
FACTS AND TRAVEL
A. Lopes
In Lopes, the defendant, Jorge Lopes, was charged with four
counts of first-degree sexual assault under R.I. General Laws sec-
tion 11-37-2, 7 and two counts of acts against nature pursuant to
R.I. General Laws section 11-10-1.8 At trial before the Superior
Court, the victim testified that Lopes forced her to go to his resi-
dence, where he then coerced her into two acts of oral sex, one act
of vaginal intercourse and one act of anal intercourse.9 Lopes testi-
1. Black's Law Dictionary defines crimes against nature as "sexual inter-
course per os or per anum between human beings who are not husband and wife
and any form of sexual intercourse with an animal." Black's Law Dictionary 371
(6th ed. 1990).
2. U.S. Const. amend. XIV; See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965);
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); See
discussion infra pp. 252-53.
3. 660 A.2d 707 (R.I. 1995).
4. 660 A.2d 276 (R.I. 1995).
5. Lopes, 660 A.2d at 710, (quoting, State v. Santos, 413 A.2d 58 (R.I. 1980)).
6. Id.; Chiaradio, 660 A.2d at 278.
7. Lopes, 660 A.2d at 708. See also R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37-2 (1956) as
amended by 1987 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 238, § 1.
8. Lopes, 660 A.2d at 708. See also R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-10-1 (1956). The Act
states: "Every person who shall be convicted of the abominable and detestable
crime against nature, either with mankind or with any beast, shall be imprisoned
not exceeding twenty (20) years nor less than seven (7) years."
9. Lopes, 660 A.2d at 708.
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fled that the victim had consented to sex, and that only one act of
oral sex occurred. 10 The jury acquitted Lopes on all counts of first
degree sexual assault, but found that he was guilty of two counts of
crimes against nature, namely, the acts of oral sex and anal
intercourse."
After the guilty verdicts were entered, Lopes filed a motion
with the superior court for arrest of judgement under superior
court Rule 34.12 Lopes argued that section 11-10-1 of the Rhode
Island General Laws was an unconstitutional intrusion on his
right to privacy, and that section 11-10-1 violated the equal-protec-
tion clause of both the United States and Rhode Island Constitu-
tions because it treats married and unmarried couples
differently. 13  While the superior court, citing State v. Santos,
found that unmarried persons did not have a fundamental right to
privacy with respect to acts against nature, the court concluded
that married couples have a greater right of privacy than unmar-
ried couples and the prosecution of married couples under section
11-10-1 would be unconstitutional. 14 Thus, the superior court rea-
soned that since section 11-10-1 treated equally situated couples
differently it violated the equal-protection clause. 15 As such, the
issues before the supreme court on appeal were; (1) whether the
"fundamental right to privacy of unmarried persons . . . encom-
pass[es] [the] right to commit crimes against nature,"16 and, (2)
whether the superior court erred in ruling that section 11-10-1 vio-
lated the equal-protection clause. 17
10. Id. at 708
11. Id. at 709.
12. Id. Rhode Island Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 34
states:
The court on motion of a defendant shall arrest judgment if the indict-
ment, information, or complaint does not charge an offense or if the court
was without jurisdiction of the offense charged. The motion in arrest of
judgment shall be made within ten (10) days after verdict or finding of
guilty, or after plea of guilty or nolo contendere, or within such further
time as the court may fix during the 10-day period.
13. Lopes, 660 A.2d at 709.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 707.
17. Lopes, 660 A.2d at 709.
1996]
252 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 1:213
B. Chiaradio
In Chiaradio, Paul Chiaradio and Stephen C. Turrisi were
each charged with one count of an act against nature stemming
from their engaging in acts of oral sex upon female exotic dancers
during a bachelor party.'8 Both defendants moved to dismiss the
charges stemming from section 11-10-1 on the grounds that it had
been declared unconstitutional by the superior court in State v.
Lopes.' 9 Because both parties determined that the question of
constitutionality in Lopes had yet to be finally determined by the
supreme court, the question of section 11-10-1 's constitutionality
was certified to the supreme court.20
BACKGROUND
While there is no express provision of a right to privacy in
either the Rhode Island or United States Constitutions, the Bill of
Rights to the United States Constitution provides for a right of per-
sonal privacy. 21 The United States Supreme Court in Griswold v.
Connecticut,22 in overturning a state law banning contraceptives,
found that the Bill of Rights carves out a zone of personal privacy
for married couples that the government may not interfere with.23
18. Chiaradio, 660 A.2d at 277. The facts of the case, which include the spe-
cific sexual activities of both Chiaradio and Turrisi at the bachelor party were stip-
ulated to by the parties exclusively for the purposes of determining the question
certified to the supreme court.
19. Id.
20. Id. R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-24-27 (1956) states:
Whenever in any proceedings, civil or criminal, legal or equitable, in the
superior court or in any district court, any question of law shall arise, or
the constitutionality of an act of the general assembly shall be brought in
question upon the record, which in the opinion of the court, or in the opin-
ion of the attorney-general, if the state be a party to such proceeding or if
he has intervened therein, is of such doubt and importance and so affects
the merits of the controversy that it ought to be determined by the
supreme court before further proceedings, the court in which the cause is
pending shall certify such question or motion to the supreme court for
that purpose and stay all further proceedings until the question is heard
and determined; Provided, That no question shall be so certified in any
criminal case where the defendant has not been released on bail.
21. U.S. Const. amend. XIV.; State v. Santos, 413 A.2d 58, 66 (R.I. 1980).
22. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
23. Id. at 485-86. The U.S. Supreme Court in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.
438 (1972), extended the court's holding in Griswold regarding contraceptives to
include unmarried couples. While the Court in Lopes recognized the expansion of
privacy rights made in Eisenstadt, it was unpersuaded that § 11-10-1's constitu-
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Further, in Roe v. Wade24 , the Supreme Court held that only those
rights that are "fundamental" are protected by the right to privacy,
which includes those activities involving marriage, contraception
and procreation. 25
The constitutionality of section 11-10-1 has been addressed by
the Rhode Island Supreme Court a number of times in the past.26
In particular, the question of whether the proscriptions of section
11-10-1 violate a person's right to privacy was addressed by the
court in State v. Santos, where the court determined that because
the acts against nature prohibited by section 11-10-1 did not relate
directly to the procreative rights defined as protected in Roe, they
were not protected by the constitutional right to privacy.27
ANALYSIs AND HOLDING
In State v. Lopes, the court affirmed the trial court's ruling
that the offense of an abominable and detestible crime against na-
ture is not protected by an unmarried person's right to privacy. 28
In reaching this conclusion, the court based its reasoning on its
past decision in State v. Santos, holding that the prosecution of an
unmarried person under section 11-10-1 is constitutional when the
tionality was determined by Eisenstadt since Eisenstadt's scope was clearly within
the "family relationships, marriage, or procreation" field.
24. 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973).
25. Santos, 413 A.2d at 68.
26. In State v. Milne, 187 A.2d 136 (R.I. 1962), the court determined that pro-
scribed conduct of "all acts against nature" was not so overly vague to render the
statute void for vagueness. This position was further reinforced by the court in
State v. Levitt, 371 A.2d 596 (R.I. 1977), as well as Santos, 413 A.2d 58 (R.I. 1980)
(statute that forbade detestable and unnatural sexual acts not unconstitutionally
vague when applied against accused who committed anal sex upon victim).
27. Santos, 413 A.2d at 68. In its opinion in Santos the court noted at length
that its position with respect to personal privacy rights in certain sexual acts was
not followed in many states. See, e.g., State v. Saunders, 381 A.2d 333 (N.J. 1977)
(fornication statute prohibiting sex between unmarried couples unconstitutionally
infringes upon citizen's right to privacy, even in light of state's interest in prevent-
ing illegitimate children and sexually transmitted diseases); State v. Callaway,
542 P.2d 1147 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1975) (statute prohibiting sodomy and unnatural
acts unconstitutionally infringes on unmarried couple's right of privacy); State v.
Elliot, 539 P.2d 207 (N.M. Ct. App. 1975) (state's police power does not encompass
ability to prohibit sodomy between unmarried consenting couples); In re P., 400
N.Y.S. 2d 455 (Fam.Ct. 1977) (statute that prohibits unmarried consenting adults
from deviate sexual activity violates equal protection clause when it would not for-
bid married couples from performing same acts).
28. Lopes, 660 A.2d at 710.
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acts did not involve "family relationships, marriage, or
procreation."29
The Lopes Court, however, reversed the trial court's ruling
that section 11-10-1 violated the equal-protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 30 The supreme court found that the trial
judge misstated the law when he concluded that section 11-10-1
could not be constitutionally applied to married persons, and fur-
ther noted that this question was not properly before the trial
judge for his decision, because the issue was never brought up at
trial.31 Furthermore, the court ruled that the trial court's determi-
nation that a married person's right to privacy afforded him the
right to participate in acts against nature was unfounded and not
supported by the holdings of either the United States or the Rhode
Island Supreme Court.32 The court reasoned that because the trial
court could not properly determine whether married persons were
governed by section 11-10-1, it was foreclosed from an equal-pro-
tection analysis.3 3 Finally, the court concluded that, in light of its
holding in State v. Santos, the trial court erred in determining that
married couples and unmarried couples were similarly situated for
equal protection clause analysis, for Santos is silent on the ques-
tion of the applicability of section 11-10-1 to married couples. 34
In Chiaradio, the court postponed its decision until its opinion
in Lopes was decided.3 5 Based upon its holding in Lopes, the court
had little difficulty in determining that section 11-10-1 was consti-
tutionally applied to both defendants. 36 As the unmarried defend-
ant in Lopes had no protectable privacy interest in engaging in oral
sex with a woman, the court reasoned that the right to privacy ar-
gument was foreclosed in Chiaradio, where the defendants were
unmarried. 37
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 709.
32. Lopes, 660 A.2d at 709.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Chiaradio, 660 A.2d at 277.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 277-78.
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CONCLUSION
By reinforcing the notion that sexual acts that do not result in
procreation are acts against nature, the court in both Lopes and
Chiaradio is simply upholding Rhode Island statutory law that
dates as far back as 1897. Although this position is supported sol-
idly by prior decisions, its outcome may not necessarily coincide
with the state of the law in other jurisdictions as well as current
societal norms of what is tolerable sexual behavior.
Edward M. Medici, Jr.
